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Abstract
History occupies a somewhat awkward position in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari. Although they often criticise history as a practice and advance alternatives 
that are explicitly anti-historical, such as ‘nomadology’ and ‘geophilosophy’, their 
scholarship is nevertheless littered with historical encounters and deeply influenced 
by historians such as Fernand Braudel. One of Deleuze and Guattari’s more significant 
engagements with history occurs through their reading and theory of universal history. 
In this paper I will explicate and critically analyse the nature of this universal history 
vis-à-vis its most pertinent counterpoint: Hegel’s philosophy of world history. In con-
trast to Hegel’s form of historicism, which universalizes by virtue of a unitary and total-
izing force, Deleuze and Guattari develop a universalizing mechanism that is strictly 
devoid of any privileged essence. Following, Deleuze and Guattari’s form of universal 
history is marked above all by contingency as opposed to necessity. In this paper I will 
show precisely how. I will also go on to demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari’s uni-
versal history offers the promise of an historical ontology commensurate with the pro-
cesses of creativity and becoming, provided that appropriate steps are taken to reaffirm 
the radical contingency at its heart.
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1 Introduction
In their final joint work, What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari heavily 
criticize Hegel’s treatment of history, reiterating an ambivalence that they 
had long held towards both history and Hegel. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, 
“unforeseeable creativity”, in Hegel, is “poorly understood”, for Hegel histori-
cizes reality, reducing it to “an analytic and necessary principle” that teleologi-
cally unfolds in history – the unravelling of history itself, guided by the light of 
Geist.1 Given this distaste for historical formulations that reductively subject 
reality to a unitary and totalizing force, it is somewhat surprising that Deleuze 
and Guattari simultaneously employ a form of universal history in their own 
work. However, if this notion of universal history differs from that found in 
Hegel, it is largely due to the insistence of Deleuze and Guattari upon its con-
tingent, critical and creative capacities – aspects they believe are ultimately 
absent in Hegel, despite appearances to the contrary. By showing how history 
has the capacity to be universal yet contingent and auto-critical, history for 
Deleuze and Guattari is no longer placed in the service of a totalizing power 
(pouvoir). Instead, history itself exudes a power (puissance) of ongoing creativ-
ity that is capable of accommodating the process of becoming, in turn ren-
dering history genuinely universal. If this gives rise to a notion of history that 
distinguishes itself from the image of Hegel’s ‘State history’, then this, I will 
argue, is precisely the point of their universal history: the positing of a form of 
history that is nonlinear, contingent and creative, in contrast to the Hegelian 
histories of necessity that they oppose.
In order to demonstrate how this universal history works I will begin by 
briefly discussing Hegel’s universal history, and in particular the role that both 
contingency and necessity play in it. Following this I will consider Deleuze and 
Guattari’s objections, before setting out their alternative universal history. As 
we will see, the mechanism of their universalism (the complementary con-
junction of decoding/deterritorialization and axiomatization) functions in a 
completely different manner to that of Hegel’s, allowing in turn for a universal-
ization of contingency as opposed to necessity. Grasping the novelty of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s account, however, will require a closer look at exactly how con-
tingency works in their universal history. The second half of this paper will 
therefore involve an examination of two kinds of contingency –  ‘retrospective’ 
and ‘continual’ – the latter of which, I argue, carries the promise of a universal 
history coordinate with ‘unforeseeable creativity’.
1    G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 94–5.
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2 The Universal History of Necessity
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel stipulates a number 
of different kinds of history – that is, ways in which historians in the past 
have written about and approached history.2 As we find in this historiogra-
phy, Hegel refers to the kind of history that he is practicing as ‘philosophical 
world history’.3 This history, Hegel says, brings with itself only “the simple idea 
of  reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is 
therefore a rational process”.4 And so it is that Hegel presents us with, in short, 
a rational history of the process whereby rationality becomes progressively 
rational, to the point at which it is fully rational – that is, in the dialectical 
thought of Hegel. Employing the mechanics from his broader philosophical 
system, Hegel chronicles the journey of reason and spirit as it becomes increas-
ingly self- conscious and increasingly free or liberated, beginning in the Orient 
and continuing through the Greek and Roman world en route to Hegel’s study 
in Germany.
What reason is liberated from, in one respect, is history. For example, in the 
Orient, according to Hegel, its people are shackled by inherited traditions. A 
strict adherence to historical traditions, in this respect, inhibits the ability of 
these people to realize that they are free. For Hegel, however, the progressive 
emergence of reason and freedom does not involve an overcoming of history 
per se, since it is this very process that Hegel calls ‘history’. Reason and free-
dom, as such, are by no means ahistorical. On the contrary, reason and the 
categories of the understanding develop in history, and history is nothing other 
than this development. The identity and nature of being and spirit in Hegel 
are thus not ahistorical or immutable; to the contrary, they are if anything the 
process or activity of historical self-production.
2    I should note that while much of the explication of Hegel’s philosophy of history in this sec-
tion of the paper may appear rather straightforward to the learned Hegelian, this rehearsal 
nevertheless remains quite necessary, given that later sections of the paper will seek to illus-
trate precisely where and how Deleuze and Guattari depart from Hegel’s account. Indeed, it 
is this juxtaposition, as opposed to advancing a novel reading of Hegel’s philosophy of history 
on its own, that serves as a major objective of the paper.
3   Although Hegel prefers the term ‘philosophical world history’ to ‘universal history’, it would 
nevertheless be accurate to refer to his ‘philosophical world history’ as an example of ‘univer-
sal history’, given that it displays many of the telltale signs – most of all the incorporation of 
all (human) history under a unitary rubric (which this paper will now go on to discuss).
4   G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press Hegel, 1975), 27.
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History, as such, has a quite specific (and somewhat narrow) meaning in 
Hegel. And this must be borne in mind when we consider controversial state-
ments such as Hegel’s proclamation of ‘the end of history’. In this instance, what 
Hegel is referring to is the point at which spirit becomes both self-determining 
and fully aware of this process, and as such fully free, thus bringing to an end 
the historical process of its emergence. In the words of Stephen Houlgate:
Note that this is not a claim about everything that has happened in the 
past, but a claim about what is to be understood by the word ‘history’. 
What Hegel is arguing is that only those sequences of events which have 
been brought about by the development of human self-consciousness 
and by the pursuit of consciously articulated goals can really count as 
historical.5
When this happens, it is not as if the world comes to an end. The historical 
process of World Spirit’s realization may have come to an end, but this ‘end’ is 
nothing if not a new beginning, the beginning of an era in which creativity and 
critique are possible and able to be realized like never before, since they are 
raised to the absolute level of self-creation and self-critique. In this manner, 
Hegel’s philosophy of history could thus be said to be an explanation of how 
creativity becomes possible – or more specifically, how the creative force of 
spirit becomes fully realized, self-productive and entirely free.6 As Hegel says:
To say that spirit exists would at first seem to imply that it is a completed 
entity. On the contrary it is by nature active, and activity is its essence; 
it is its own product, and therefore its own beginning and own end. Its 
freedom does not consist in static being, but in a constant negation of 
all that threatens to destroy freedom. The business of spirit is to produce 
itself, to make itself its own object, and to gain knowledge of itself; in this 
way, it exists for itself.7
5   S. Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Blackwell Publishing 
Houlgate, 2005), 19. As Houlgate also notes, for Hegel “the structure of our concepts and cat-
egories is identical with, and thus discloses, the structure of the world itself, because we 
ourselves are born into and so share the character of the world we encounter” (Houlgate, An 
Introduction to Hegel, 5–6).
6   For more on this interpretation within the secondary literature, see A. Speight, The Philosophy 
of Hegel (Stocksfield: Acumen Speight, 2008), 98. See also W. Maker, “The End of History 
and the Nihilism of Becoming”, in Hegel and History, ed. W. Dudley (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 
2009), 25–6.
7   Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 48.
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So, if we take Hegel at his word, the end is in fact the beginning, and the 
mechanism of negation is activity and dynamism par excellence, since what is 
negated is that which restricts freedom and the self-realization of a self- critical 
faculty. Spirit, furthermore, is not a pre-accomplished or ahistorical entity, 
insofar as it develops itself in and through history, and is thus historical. Spirit, 
in this respect, does not merely happen ‘in’ history, for it is what makes history, 
and in a certain sense is history. Hegel’s philosophy of creation, as such, is pre-
eminently historical, which suggests in turn why his philosophy of history is so 
strikingly central to his broader philosophy.
Similar points can be made when discussing the issue of contingency in 
Hegel’s work. Hegel is often considered to have advanced a philosophy of his-
tory opposed to contingency, no doubt due to statements such as the following:
The sole aim of philosophical enquiry is to eliminate the contingent. 
Contingency is the same as external necessity, that is, a necessity which 
originates in causes which are themselves no more than external circum-
stances. In history, we must look for a general design, the ultimate end of 
the world, and not a particular end of the subjective spirit or mind; and 
we must comprehend it by means of reason, which cannot concern itself 
with particular or finite ends, but only with the absolute.8
Although this passage implies that Hegel is opposed to contingency, it could 
be noted that Hegel does not mean to suggest here that contingency can or 
should be eliminated from the world. On the contrary, contingency plays a cru-
cial role throughout Hegel’s philosophy of history. For example, to state the 
obvious, history clearly does not proceed in a smooth and measured fashion, 
casually bettering itself over time. Instead, as Hegel argues, the development 
of history proceeds by way of struggle and contradiction. A certain kind of 
society, with a certain degree of freedom and self-consciousness, exists for a 
certain contingent amount of time. Various contingent external circumstances 
and experiences impact upon both the relative continuity of this society, and 
ultimately, the timing and manner in which contradictions emerge that pre-
cipitate the progression of spirit from one level to the next. The specifics of his-
torical progression, in other words, are by no means set in stone, and indeed, 
any progression that occurs is always specifically relative to the contingencies 
that it is faced with. But even more significantly, without the various struggles 
and contradictions that are thrown up by contingent occurrences and expe-
riences, history will in fact be unable to proceed from one level of freedom 
8   Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 28.
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and self-consciousness to the next. For this reason, it could be claimed that 
although it is the prerogative of reason to progressively eliminate contingency, 
Hegel’s philosophy of history is not itself opposed to contingency, since contin-
gency is required for the necessary progression of reason. As Iain Macdonald 
puts it: 
By emphasizing experience, then, it becomes clearer how to interpret the 
demand that philosophy ‘eliminate the contingent’. Contingency is not 
 ‘extirpated’ by the concept; on the contrary, it is the historical moment 
of self-evaluation and self-correction prompted by doubt or suffering. 
Contingency is for that reason required for consciousness to recognize 
itself in the concept, for consciousness to redetermine and transform the 
universal as a result of contradictions that surge up in experience.9
From such statements we can see why scholars of Hegel’s philosophy of his-
tory might be tempted to defend its creative and contingent credentials.10 
Nevertheless we are compelled to ask: is it in fact accurate to say that the his-
torical process elucidated in Hegel’s philosophy of history is genuinely creative, 
contingent and open-ended? Can Hegel evade accusations of teleology, and if 
not, then does this not fatally compromise any attempt to forward a philosophy 
of becoming irreducible to being, and contingency irreducible to necessity? 
It may be that the progress of history, the path that it takes, is circuitous and 
full of surprises. But this path has a name – Geist, reason, freedom – and it also 
has a destination – absolute reason, the full realization of self-consciousness 
and freedom. And it is to these ends that contingency must answer in Hegel. 
The universal, it may be countered, itself transforms through history. But again, 
this is true only to the extent that the various universals are progressive stages 
en route to the absolute: immature or underdeveloped versions of a final form. 
Such transformations are thus arguably foregone. 
It could therefore be claimed with some justification that the contingency 
of Hegel’s philosophy of history is incidental or at best secondary. More pre-
cisely, it is reducible to the absolute. The giveaway is the word ‘required’. To say 
that contingency is ‘required’ for the purposes of consciousness and reason to 
9     I. Macdonald, “What is Conceptual History?”, in Hegel: New Directions, ed. K. Deligiorgi 
(Acumen, 2006), 221–2.
10    See for example K. de Boer, “Hegel’s Account of the Present: An Open-Ended History”, 
in Hegel and History, ed. W. Dudley (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2009). See also Macdonald, 
“What is Conceptual History” and Maker, “The End of History and the Nihilism of 
Becoming”.
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function in the way that Hegel wants it to, I would suggest, is hardly a ringing 
endorsement of contingency as such. Hegel’s broader argument may ‘require’ 
a notion of contingency as described above in order to work, but this in itself 
does not demonstrate the existence of genuine contingency in history or in 
Hegel’s philosophy of history. To put it another way, necessary and universal 
reason is clearly the motor of history in Hegel’s account, and if contingency is 
required, it is to serve as fuel for this motor. The supremacy of the necessary 
over the contingent thus remains firmly intact in Hegel’s account, regardless of 
the need for contingent occurrences to serve as cannon-fodder for the mecha-
nism of dialectical development.11
We are thus left with a number of doubts about the status of contingency 
and creativity in Hegel’s philosophy of world history. While some criticism 
can be warded off by reemphasising the specific context and terms of refer-
ence within which it is advanced – namely, reason, spirit and freedom – such 
a response obviously does little to alleviate the concerns of those commen-
tators who view Hegelian reason, spirit, and the mechanism of dialectical 
development with suspicion to begin with. Furthermore, we are left to ques-
tion whether Hegel’s account of universal history is able to genuinely accom-
modate for the process of creativity, becoming and a concept of contingency 
irreducible to necessity.
Deleuze and Guattari are two such commentators with suspicions about the 
success of Hegel. As they claim in their late text What Is Philosophy?, Hegel 
seeks to link philosophy and its history via an analytic and necessary princi-
ple. But as they maintain, this can only be done by retrospectively placing the 
possibility of reason’s eventual emergence into its own past. As such, it is the 
universal that, for Hegel, necessarily locates its origins in the past – itself a nec-
essary act of self-legitimation. History for Hegel is thus, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, “a form of interiority in which the concept necessarily develops 
11    Karin de Boer attempts to ameliorate this situation by noting that “Hegel never purports 
to construct the successive stages of world history by means of reason alone”, since he 
must “always draw on empirical investigations”. But as she goes on to admit, Hegel’s 
‘empirical investigations’ are unambiguously interpreted with a specific purpose in 
mind – “to lay bare the essential moments of [freedom’s] actualization” – and from the 
perspective of reason. de Boer thus ultimately agrees that Hegel’s history is driven by 
necessity: “By relegating these aspects [eg. the succession of events and the fate of indi-
viduals] to the realm of mere contingency, only those aspects of world history that testify 
to the increasing actualization of freedom emerge as essential to world history as such”. 
See de Boer, “Hegel’s Account of the Present”, 53–4.
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or unveils its destiny”.12 And as they further specify, this historicist account 
“rests on the abstraction of the historical element rendered circular”.13
The cycle they are referring to is the following: absolute reason emerges 
within a history of contingencies, but as it emerges, it progressively and ret-
rospectively universalizes the particularities from which it emerges, elevating 
or abstracting out certain aspects and diminishing others in order to manu-
facture an intelligible linear progression. Because of this, it could be techni-
cally argued that rationality is not imposed from the outside onto history, but 
is itself historical, since reason emerges from within and through history. This 
historical development, however, takes the form of a teleological progression 
that leads to a particular point, from which – and only from which – this his-
tory can be identified as such. If rationality and history are immanent to one 
another, therefore, it is because history has been retrospectively internalized 
by the mechanics of reason. And this is why Deleuze and Guattari say that 
philosophical reason, for Hegel, is indistinguishable from its own history.14
This result should hardly be surprising, since Hegel himself says: “Whoever 
looks at the world rationally will find that it in turn assumes a rational aspect”.15 
Henri Bergson, interestingly, says a similar thing about the intellect, noting 
how it cannot but help intellectualise the world, and thus fixate things such as 
duration, which is in reality a flowing continuity. But as Bergson also says: “it 
would be a strange mistake to take for a constitutive element of doctrine what 
was only the means of expressing it”.16 It is true that Hegel is not attempting 
to explain everything that has ever happened in the past through the prism 
of reason and World Spirit, but even in the areas that pertain to his analysis, 
it would appear that Hegel is knowingly amalgamating the processes of gen-
esis and expression in his conception of reason. If there is an advantage in 
this approach, it is that history becomes universalizable under the rubric of 
reason, and following, the process of understanding becomes synonymous 
with the process of genesis. As Stephen Houlgate succinctly puts it: “we pro-
duce ourselves precisely through developing a fuller understanding that we 
do so”.17 But if there is a disadvantage, it is that the existence of unforeseeable 
12    Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 95. 
13    Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 95.
14    Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 95.
15    Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 29.
16    H. Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. M. L. Andison 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Bergson, 2007), 91.
17    Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, 21.
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creativity becomes compromised, since its contingency is ultimately reducible 
to necessity.
Bearing this in mind, let us now turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative 
formulation of universal history, paying particular attention to how it differs 
from, and at times resembles, Hegel’s account.
3 The Universal History of Capitalism
Somewhat curiously, due to their critique of Hegel, Deleuze and Guattari also 
advance a theory of universal history. This universal history, however, differs in 
several key respects. To begin with, Hegel’s philosophical world history, as we 
have seen, is more specifically a universal history of reason: it is a history not 
only ‘of ’ reason, but a rational history of reason, advanced from the privileged 
position after reason has been fully realized. Deleuze and Guattari’s universal 
history, on the other hand, will not be of reason, but of capitalism. In truth, 
Deleuze and Guattari do not have that much to say about the actual history 
of capitalism, and what they do say is mostly lifted from other historians, such 
as Fernand Braudel and Etienne Balazs. But they do remark quite extensively 
on the topic of capitalist history, by which I mean, a history that is capitalist in 
nature, and universal by virtue of this capitalist nature. So the question then 
becomes, how is it that capitalism universalizes the world and its history?18
To answer this we will have to recount the manner in which the capital-
ist machine works for Deleuze and Guattari – how it operates – with respect 
to other non-capitalist machines. As they expound in Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus, there are three great social machines – by which they 
mean, roughly, ways in which social reality is produced. The first of these 
social machines, what they refer to as the ‘primitive territorial machine’, oper-
ates by way of coding. For example, under the process of ‘coding’, the land 
that is the earth is converted into and understood as ‘territory’, which is then 
socially and politically organised and managed under this rubric. Human 
bodies are also similarly marked and socially/politically coded according to 
18    It might seem somewhat of a deviation here to start talking about capitalism, but bear in 
mind that my interest in this paper is in universal history and how it works in Deleuze and 
Guattari, with respect to Hegel. To understand universal history in Hegel one needs inves-
tigate his notion of reason and the rational nature of history, but to understand universal 
history in the work of Deleuze and Guattari requires an appreciation of their analysis of 
capitalism, given that it is capitalism (as opposed to reason) that is responsible for deter-
mining the conditions of their universal history.
60 Lundy
journal of the philosophy of history 10 (2016) 51–75
this ‘primitive machine’. In contrast to this process of coding, there is a sec-
ond social machine – the ‘imperial machine’ – that operates by overcoding the 
various codes of society. This is to say that the imperial machine overlays a 
new unitary meaning on all the various codes that it encounters in society. As 
such, it is a despotic force that imposes itself as “the sole distributor and refer-
ent of social significations”.19 Finally, there is what Deleuze and Guattari refer 
to as the ‘civilized capitalist machine’. This social machine is defined not by 
coding or overcoding but decoding, or what is also referred to by Deleuze and 
Guattari as deterritorialization, which in this context simply means the detach-
ment of social meaning from a ‘territory’ or system of organization – a process 
that is invariably followed by a reterritorialization onto a new or other terri-
tory that organizes meaning differently. In this manner, capitalism, in the view 
of Deleuze and Guattari, works by breaking down (decoding) the codings and 
overcodings in society, allowing in turn for their reinscription and exchange.
Apart from this function of decoding or deterritorialization, there is a sec-
ond key feature of capitalism that distinguishes it from other social machines: 
its axiomatic structure.20 By axiomatic, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly mean 
that as defined and used by modern mathematics:
If it is true that we are not using the word axiomatic as a simple meta-
phor, we must review what distinguishes an axiomatic from all manner 
of codes, overcodings, and recodings: the axiomatic deals directly with 
purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, 
and which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultane-
ously; codes, on the other hand, are relative to those domains and express 
specific relations between qualified elements that cannot be subsumed 
by a higher formal unity (overcoding) except by transcendence and in an 
indirect fashion. The immanent axiomatic finds in the domains it moves 
through so many models, termed models of realization.21
Thus axioms do not offer their own exegeses but rather provide the formal 
system and operational field in which differential relations and capitalizations 
occur. Because of this, the axiomatic axis of capitalism is uniquely positioned 
19    J. Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (London and New York: 
Continuum Lampert, 2006), 125.
20    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 246: “[Capitalism] axiomatizes with the one hand 
what it decodes with the other”.
21    G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. B. Massumi. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1989), 454.
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to interface with the processes of becoming that define its other side. As exist-
ing structures of coding and overcoding are decoded by capitalism, the capital-
ist machine can appropriate any and all of these escaping flows by adding on a 
new axiom or subtracting an old one. This gives capitalism an unrivalled flex-
ibility and multiple realizability. Changes in the social field lead to the addition 
of new axioms, which in turn generate a new structure from which further 
decodings escape, only to then be reabsorbed by the addition of new axioms 
that ‘capitalize’ upon the newly generated difference. Examples of this process 
offered by Deleuze and Guattari include Keynesian economics and the New 
Deal – invented axioms that at one and the same time block escaping flows, 
renew the vibrancy of capitalism, allow for its continual growth, and in so 
doing create new deterritorializations that will in time necessitate recapturing 
by other axioms. In this manner, capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari conclude, 
continually displaces its own limits in the very same moment (or movement) 
that it realizes them. And this is indeed the “deepest law of capitalism: it con-
tinually sets and then repels its own limits, but in doing gives rise to numerous 
flows in all directions that escape its axiomatic”.22
Crucially for our purposes here, it is through this two-sided mechanism of 
decoding/deterritorialization and axiomatization that the capitalist machine 
universalizes the world. Capitalism’s ability to continually meet and overcome 
its own limits illuminates a key aspect of the capitalist machine: there are no 
sacred axioms in capitalism. Capitalism exhibits a profound heterogeneity, a 
willingness if not need to incessantly change what it ‘is’. This is why Deleuze 
and Guattari claim that capitalism is not a homogenizing force, contrary to 
common interpretations, but at best isomorphic: the capitalist machine does 
not make everything the same in kind, but rather trades in all kinds. Indeed, 
the capitalist machine requires a peripheral polymorphy of heteromorphic 
social formations that enable the capitalization of difference to continue. 
Far from homogenizing the world, capitalism “gives rise to and organises the 
‘Third World’ ”.23 Thus if capitalism is able to instantiate a field of immanence 
that spreads itself across the globe – the capitalist world market – it is due 
to the heterogeneous nexus made possible by the complementary relation of 
deterritorialization with axiomatization.
When capitalism is so described, it becomes impossible to perfectly define 
the form of the capitalist machine from the outset, for capitalism itself is 
22    Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 472. See also Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus, 231 and G. Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. M. Joughin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 171.
23    Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 437.
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constantly breaking down – it is by no means a well-oiled machine, but a beau-
tiful disaster. Capitalism is characterised by anachronism, by fits and bursts, 
ebbs and flows, axiomatization and deterritorialization. This nature allows 
capitalism to incorporate not only the diversity of existing codings and over-
codings in the present world, but all that has come before it, forming nothing 
less than “a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed”.24 And 
it is in doing so that capitalism gives rise to a universal history. Capitalism is 
able to occupy every point in history, for it has no point of its own; it is able to 
interpret every coding and overcoding throughout history, for it has no essen-
tial or necessary code or sign of its own. Like a spectre or faceless ghost, capi-
talism haunts all previous forms of society “as their terrifying nightmare, [. . .] 
the dread they feel of a flow that would elude their codes”.25 For this reason, 
“capitalism”, Deleuze and Guattari say, “determines the conditions and the pos-
sibility of a universal history”.26
Now, admittedly, it would be possible to draw parallels between this account 
of capitalism and Hegel’s account of reason: for instance, both thrive on crisis, 
and both ‘require’ a peripheral polymorphy of heteromorphic social formations 
in order to validate their universalism. But one significant difference between 
the two is the manner in which this validation occurs. Insofar as Hegel’s uni-
versal history subordinates history to the teleological development of reason 
and spirit, it proceeds by way of overcoding. Deleuze and Guattari’s universal 
history, in contrast, is universal by virtue of its process of decoding and axi-
omatization. This distinction is of paramount importance. In fact, I would go 
so far as to say that if Deleuze and Guattari are to avoid becoming Hegelian 
on this issue, the distinction between these two machines – the despotic and 
24    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 34 and 267. This phrase is taken by Deleuze and 
Guattari from F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. G. Parkes (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press Nietzsche, 2005), 104.
25    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 140. It could be noted that no other Deleuzian com-
mentator, to the best of my knowledge, has specifically located the source of capitalism’s 
universalism explicitly and primarily in the complementary relation between its two axes 
of decoding/deterritorialization and axiomatization. Those who have written on the sub-
ject (such as Eugene Holland, Jason Read and Jay Lampert) have tended instead to focus 
on the retrospective nature of the capitalist machine when describing how it is that capi-
talism universalizes – something which I will go on to discuss further below. To take one 
example, “capitalism conducts universal history”, according to Lampert, “not only because 
it lies at the end of history so far; it does so because its decoding mechanisms make 
retrospectivity possible” (Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History), 123.
26    G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. R. Lane (London 
and New York: Continuum, 1984), 140.
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the capitalist – and the manner in which they operate, must be repeatedly and 
strictly maintained. Put otherwise, if Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history 
differs from Hegel’s, it is not merely because the two theories involve different 
sources for the production of historical intelligibility, reason and spirit in the 
case of Hegel and capitalism in the case of Deleuze and Guattari. More signifi-
cantly, it is because these two theories of universal history involve two differ-
ent kinds of processes that operate in distinctly different ways, according to 
different mechanisms – one that is despotic while the other is deterritorializing. 
Thus it is not just that we have two different sources for universalizing history, 
but rather two different forms or mechanisms of universalization.
It must be noted, however, that Deleuze and Guattari do not always main-
tain this distinction, in turn giving their theory of universal history a Hegelian 
feeling at times. To better explain, let us return more directly to the issue of 
contingency, focusing in particular on a variant that is principally defined by 
its retrospectivity, before turning to another form that I refer to as ‘continual 
contingency’.27
4 The Retrospective Contingency of Universal History
As discussed above, it is doubtful whether there is any genuine contingency in 
Hegel’s universal history, which is to say, a contingency that is not reducible to 
necessity. Largely in response to Hegel’s account, Deleuze and Guattari claim 
that universal history must be “the history of contingencies, and not the his-
tory of necessity”.28 Thus in contrast to the Hegelian form of internal necessary 
development, Deleuze and Guattari insist upon reaffirming the contingent 
nature of events. But what do they mean here by contingency?
Surprisingly, Deleuze and Guattari reproduce at times the necessary- 
contingency formulation that we have just critiqued when explaining their 
universal history. In Hegel, as we have seen, the happenings of external circum-
stances, or what specifically happens in actuality, is largely contingent – things 
27    As a point of comparison, Jay Lampert identifies seven different traits or senses of con-
tingency in Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history (see Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Philosophy of History, 120). While there is some conceptual overlap, broadly speaking, 
between the forms of contingency isolated by Lampert and the two that I will now dis-
cuss, there is no clear correlation between his forms and mine. In what follows I will 
therefore eschew discussing the intricacies of Lampert’s treatment in favor of explicating 
my own.
28    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 140, 195 and 224.
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needn’t have happened in the precise way they did, exactly when they did. But 
as we also saw, these contingencies and our understanding of them are nev-
ertheless contingent upon something. In the case of Hegel, this something is 
rationality. But for Deleuze and Guattari, universal history is contingent upon 
the capitalist machine that produces it.
The link between these two accounts is retrospectivity. As Deleuze and 
Guattari contend, following Marx, capitalism retrospectively fabricates its 
own origins, in order to explain how the first original accumulation of capital 
occurred: due to their unique thriftiness, or so the story goes, the first proto-
capitalists were able to generate their own productive difference upon which 
they rightfully capitalized. Such a story, however, is told after the fact by those 
who benefited, precisely so that they may legitimately continue to do so.29 
Moreover, capitalism is retrospectively contingent not only because it fabri-
cates its beginnings, but also because it is the product of this process. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, there is an inner unity between the process of 
production and the product, and the various stages of this process can only be 
understood under the terms of the product. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words: 
“It is the thing, the unnamable, the generalized decoding of flows that reveals 
a contrario the secret of all these formations [i.e. of coding and overcoding]. 
[. . .] Whence the possibility of a retrospective reading of all history in terms of 
capitalism”.30 Capitalism thus gives rise to a universal history because it proj-
ects its origins and those of previous social formations, all of which now culmi-
nate in capitalism: “If capitalism is the universal truth, it is so in the sense that 
makes capitalism the negative of all social formations”.31
Marx famously makes this point about retrospectivity when he says that 
“Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape”. As the rest of the 
quote goes: “The intimations of higher development among the subordinate 
animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher develop-
ment is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the 
ancient, etc.”.32 This was of course exactly Hegel’s point about the growth of 
rationality, and indeed lies at the basis of his Eurocentrism: insofar as dis-
parate civilizations form a continuity in the progression of reason and spirit 
from restricted to full realization, then once full realization is achieved, it is 
29    This foundation myth, in Marx’s view, functions as the equivalent to that of ‘original sin’ 
in Christianity. See K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, trans. B. Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1977), 873.
30    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 153.
31    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 153.
32    K. Marx, Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus (London and New York: Penguin Classics, 
1975), 105.
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from this perspective, and only this perspective, that prior stages can be retro-
spectively understood as immature, incomplete or inhibited versions of itself.33
So, on this point of retrospectivity, it would appear that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s capitalist history, or the universal history of capitalism, operates in 
much the same way as Hegel’s universal history. And yet, as we know, Deleuze 
and Guattari criticise Hegel’s history for operating according to the principle of 
the State or despotic machine – namely, capture and overcoding. We therefore 
have a problem: insofar as retrospectivity is a defining feature of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s universal history – including the universal history of contingency – 
then it is difficult to see how it differs in its operation from Hegel’s universal 
history of necessity.
In response to this, as I have already intimated, we must reaffirm a distinc-
tion between the necessity of State overcoding on the one hand, and the con-
tingency and creativity of decoding and deterritorialization on the other. More 
specifically, if we are to combat universal histories of necessity and the neces-
sity of universal history – by which I mean, universal histories that are driven 
by a form of necessity – then we must insist upon not only the universal his-
tory of contingency, but the contingency of universal history – by which I mean 
both that universal history need not exist, and that if it does there is a form of 
contingency appropriate to it, and a form of the universal compatible with this 
kind of contingency.
Before I go on to suggest what this kind of contingency might look like, it 
would perhaps be prudent to expand on my critique of retrospective contin-
gency and its attendant form of universalism, given the tendency within the 
secondary literature on Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history to focus on its 
retrospectivity.34 To this end Deleuze’s notion of ‘immanent-causality’ might 
be of help. According to this concept, an effect cannot be said to transcend 
its cause, since the two must be immanent to one another. As Deleuze puts it:
33    See Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, 14.
34    See J. Read, “A Universal History of Contingency: Deleuze and Guattari on the History of 
Capitalism”, in Borderlands, Vol. 2, No.3, §5 and §21–3. Although Read provides an excel-
lent account of the retroactive nature of capitalism in this article, noting the similarities 
shared between the despotic and capitalist machines, he does not take this as reason to 
seek a form of contingency specific to capitalism. Read’s article, furthermore, focuses for 
the most part on providing a reading and explication of Deleuze and Guattari’s history of 
capitalism within the landscape of Marx’s and Marxist philosophy. While there is natu-
rally some overlap between this agenda and my own, I am more interested in examining 
the nature of contingency and necessity in Deleuze and Guattari’s brand of universalism 
with respect to Hegel’s. For this reason, I will also draw on other significant sources for 
Deleuze and Guattari’s historical ontology, such as Bergson, that are not covered by Read.
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What do we mean here by immanent cause? It is a cause which is real-
ized, integrated and distinguished in its effect. Or rather the immanent 
cause is realized, integrated and distinguished by its effect. In this way 
there is a correlation or mutual presupposition between cause and effect, 
between abstract machine and concrete assemblages [. . .].35
This idea of an immanent relation between cause and effect is a mainstay of 
Deleuze’s philosophy and goes back to his understanding of the correlation 
between a problem and its solution. A solution, Deleuze observes, is always 
immanent to the problem it is a part of:
[T]he problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way 
in which it is stated (i.e., the conditions under which it is determined as 
a problem), and of the means and terms at our disposal for stating it. In 
this sense, the history of man, from the theoretical as much as from the 
practical point of view, is that of the construction of problems.36
Deleuze is here borrowing almost directly from Bergson’s essay ‘Stating of the 
Problems’. In Bergson’s words: “The stating and solving of the problem are here 
very close to being equivalent: The truly great problems are set forth only when 
they are solved”.37 However, if there is something particularly novel and inter-
esting about Deleuze’s reading of this Bergsonian idea, it is the further connec-
tion he draws to Marx. As Deleuze continues in his analysis of Bergson:
We might compare the last sentence of this extract from Bergson with 
Marx’s formulation, which is valid for practice itself: “Humanity only sets 
itself problems that it is capable of solving”. In neither example is it a case 
of saying that problems are like the shadow of pre-existing solutions (the 
whole context suggests the contrary).38
35    G. Deleuze, Foucault, trans. S. Hand (London and New York: Continuum, 1999), 37.
36    G. Deleuze, Bergsonism (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 1988), 16. Interestingly, Deleuze 
begins his book on Nietzsche with a strikingly similar statement: “We always have the 
beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or our style of life”. 
See G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson (London and New York: 
Continuum, 1983), 1.
37    Deleuze, Bergsonism, 15–16. Compare with Bergson, The Creative Mind, 37.
38    Deleuze, Bergsonism, 16.
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It is therefore unsurprising that when Deleuze reiterates this point again in 
his magnum opus Difference and Repetition, it will be in aid of confirming 
Althusser’s reading of capitalism’s immanent causality:
Althusser and his collaborators are, therefore, profoundly correct in 
showing the presence of a genuine structure in Capital, and in reject-
ing historicist interpretations of Marxism, since this structure never acts 
transitively, following the order of succession in time; rather, it acts by 
incarnating its varieties in diverse societies and by accounting for the 
simultaneity of all the relations and terms which, each time and in each 
case, constitute the present: that is why ‘the economic’ is never given 
properly speaking but rather designates a differential virtuality to be 
interpreted, always covered over by its forms of actualisation; a theme 
or ‘problematic’ always covered over by its cases of solution. [. . .] The 
famous phrase of the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
‘mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve’, does not mean 
that the problems are only apparent or that they are already solved, but, 
on the contrary, that the economic conditions of a problem determine or 
give rise to the manner in which it finds a solution within the framework 
of the real relations of the society. [. . .] More precisely, the solution is 
always that which a society deserves or gives rise to as a consequence of 
the manner in which, given its real relations, it is able to pose the prob-
lems set within it and to it by the differential relations it incarnates.39
This reading of Marx distinguishes itself from historicist interpretations that 
attempt to explain capitalism by a necessary historical succession, but it 
does so on the grounds that capitalism, as the social formation that is pres-
ently in power, retrospectively posits its origins and incarnates itself in prior 
 formations – previous varieties of society are understood with respect to it. The 
past, as such, is covered over with a history that issues backwards from capital-
ism. Today’s capitalist reality is therefore not merely the effect of an historical 
cause but rather an ‘immanent cause’ of itself, due to its retrospective power 
and the requirement that all solutions or effects be contoured by the problem 
or social machine that poses it. 
In his later work Althusser amends this reading of capitalism’s retrospec-
tivity by elaborating further on its prehistory. As he acknowledges, any syn-
chronic logic that purports universal and fixed laws is itself produced by an 
incremental and developmental process of becoming. There is thus no such 
39    G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone Press, 1994), 186.
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thing as necessity, for the concept of necessity can at best only apply to a read-
ing of the past:
[N]o determination of these elements can be assigned except by working 
backwards from the result to its becoming, in its retroaction. If we must 
therefore say that there can be no result without its becoming (Hegel), 
we must also affirm that there is nothing which has become except 
as determined by the result of this becoming – this retroaction itself 
(Canguilhem). That is, instead of thinking contingency as a modality of 
necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as the becoming-
necessary of the encounter of contingencies.40
To label a present fact as necessary is thus somewhat misleading, accord-
ing to the late Althusser, for it was not always necessary but only becomes so. 
Althusser is attempting in this essay to insist on the contingency of factual 
occurrences that appear necessarily irrefutable: “every accomplished fact [. . .] 
is only a provisional encounter, and since every encounter is provisional even 
when it lasts, there is no eternity in the ‘laws’ of any world or any state”.41 So to 
summarize, before an encounter occurs there is a particular system in place – 
meaning in relative equilibrium. The encounter, however, acts like a tipping 
point, itself brought about by what Althusser refers to as a ‘swerve’, shatter-
ing that equilibrium and eventually bringing about a new system with its own 
systematicity. Once settled, this new system in turn redefines necessity, specifi-
cally what is necessary for it. But most importantly, this necessity need not have 
happened, for it owes its very nature to a contingent swerve and encounter. 
Necessity is thus projected backwards over the course of an historical event.42
Interestingly, Bergson arrives at a similar argument in his essay “The Possible 
and the Real”, though from the opposite direction. As his famous quote reads: 
“Backwards over the course of time a constant remodeling of the past by the 
present, of the cause by the effect, is being carried out”.43 Bergson is here 
attacking the same notion of necessity as Althusser but through its companion 
conception of the possible. As commonly understood in its Aristotelian form, 
something must be possible before it is realized, like the oak tree whose very 
possibility is contained in the acorn prior to its realization. Everything that 
40    L. Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–1987, ed. F. Matheron and 
O. Corpet, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 193–4.
41    Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 174 and 195–6.
42    Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 169.
43    Bergson, The Creative Mind, 84–5.
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occurs thus must pre-exist itself as its own possibility. But for Bergson, some-
thing which is possible can only have been possible:
As reality is created as something unforeseeable and new, its image is 
reflected behind it into the indefinite past; thus it finds that it has from 
all time been possible, but it is at this precise moment that it begins 
to have been always possible, and that is why I said that its possibility, 
which does not precede its reality, will have preceded it once the real-
ity has appeared. The possible is therefore the mirage of the present 
in the past; and as we know the future will finally constitute a present 
and the mirage effect is continually being produced, we are convinced 
that the image of tomorrow is already contained in our actual present, 
which will be the past of tomorrow, although we did not manage to grasp 
it. That is precisely the illusion.44
What all these examples have in common is the way in which a present power 
itself retrospectively posits contingency. Noting this, however, alerts us to their 
shared limitation: the retrospective sense of contingency is not on its own a 
genuinely productive and open contingency in-itself. In each case, what is 
being described is the way in which a static sense or being envelops or captures 
that which is beneath or before it. Or put differently, in each case the retro-
spective form of contingency has more to do with pouvoir (power-as-control 
or domination) then it does puissance (power-as-creation or energetic force). 
In such retrospective accounts of creativity, “Everything is accomplished in 
advance; the structure precedes its elements and reproduces them in order to 
reproduce the structure”.45
Given that this retrospective capacity is ultimately a force of capture, it is 
not surprising that Deleuze and Guattari are also able to affiliate their univer-
sal history of contingency with the primordial State, what they refer to as the 
Urstaat: “Being the common horizon for what comes before and what comes 
after, it conditions universal history only provided it is not on the outside, but 
always off to the side, the cold monster that represents the way in which his-
tory is in the ‘head’, in the ‘brain’ – the Urstaat”.46 But in recognizing this char-
acter trait, we are forced to reappraise the examples of contingency that we 
have thus far touched on: if ‘original accumulation’ and ‘original sin’ are both 
retrospective, it is in the sense of State-sanctioned histories or ‘authorized’ 
44    Bergson, The Creative Mind, 82.
45    Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 198.
46    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 220–1 (translation modified).
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biographies (gospel or secular); if Marx’s capitalist example of an effect that 
causes itself is of significance, it is only insofar as it resembles the power of 
the archaic State or despotic machine, in which “He is the sole quasi cause, the 
source and fountainhead and estuary of the apparent objective movement”.47 
This does not mean that such retrospectives are without effect – as Jason Read 
puts it, “a misrecognition of the source of production [. . .] is in turn produc-
tive, producing obedience and docility”.48 But for the same reason that this lat-
ter productivity is described by Read as a ‘displacement’ of the former, and for 
the same reason that capitalism is the negative of all social formations, it must 
be noted that a retrospective power ultimately pertains more to the power of 
capture than creation.
In light of this, we must be cautious when discussing the retrospective con-
tingency of universal history, for it is essentially synonymous with the syn-
chronic power of the despotic machine, a power which freezes time in order to 
give an ideal description – namely, the description of the Urstaat throughout 
all time. The universal history that ensues from this cannot be solely attrib-
uted to the capitalist machine, for what distinguishes capitalism from the 
synchronic State is its diachronic nature, which concerns an historical develop-
ment. This is indeed the ‘great difference’ between the two: “[T]he despotic 
machine is synchronic while the capitalist machine’s time is diachronic. The 
capitalists appear in succession in a series that institutes a kind of creativity 
of history, a strange menagerie: the schizoid time of the new creative break”.49
Following this analysis, we can conclude that if Deleuze and Guattari’s the-
ory of universal history is to avoid replicating the form of contingency as found 
in Hegel, if it is to involve a genuine and nonlinear form of contingency (by 
which I mean a form of contingency that is not reducible to necessity), then 
it must go beyond the rationale of retrospectivity. This outcome could have 
perhaps been easily foreseen: that history is written by the victors, and that this 
history will in turn give rise to various further effects, including the way people 
act, think, desire and perceive, is by no means a radical claim. In response, it 
might be argued that new readings of the past can have very real effects on the 
present (and future). But while this is most certainly true, such a claim does 
not directly challenge the causal-linear or teleological ontology that Deleuze 
and Guattari seek to problematize in Hegel. Nor does it fit with the particular 
47    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 194.
48    Read, “A Universal History of Contingency: Deleuze and Guattari on the History of 
Capitalism”, §21.
49    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 223 (emphasis added).
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nature of universalism produced by capitalism. A more radical notion of con-
tingency is therefore called for.
5 The Continual Contingency of Universal History
In my terminology, the form of contingency appropriate to this theory of uni-
versal history could be thought of as a ‘continual contingency’. In this sense of 
contingency, history is not merely shown to ‘have been’ contingent (but is no 
longer) and nor is our ‘understanding’ of history merely shown to be ‘contingent 
upon’ the forces that posit it. More profoundly, history is contingent because 
it is itself never done with, which is to say that it remains livid (as opposed 
to an inert entity manipulated or fabricated by a present power). History, in 
this respect, remains continually coexistent with the present. By ‘continually’ I 
do not mean well-measured or homogeneous, but rather what Bergson calls a 
continuous or heterogeneous multiplicity. As this heterogeneity continuously 
emerges, it does so in a nonlinear and non-teleological fashion that evades 
what Bergson would call ‘radical finalism’.50 As such, this continuity is full of 
abruptness and unpredictability. Paradoxically, it might even be more accurate 
to characterize this continuous multiplicity by “ruptures and limits, and not 
continuity”.51 For example, although the history of the French Revolution could 
be described as a singular trajectory that is continuous and heterogeneous, it 
can equally be said to be composed of nothing other than accidental encoun-
ters (in varying degrees of accidentality). The encounter and the continuum 
of history, when both understood heterogeneously, are thus not opposed, but 
compositional. State powers may recast an event in order to break or capture 
an existing continuity (for example, the contrasting ways in which the French 
Revolution is captured by the First Empire and the Third Republic, the former 
50    See H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998), 39: “The 
doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies 
that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is 
nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As 
in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus 
understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this sole 
difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose 
successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds in front of us the light with 
which it claims to guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of 
the future for the impulsion of the past. But succession remains none the less a mere 
appearance, as indeed does movement itself.”
51    Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 140.
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reducing the event to Napoleon and the latter to Republicanism), but they only 
do so by conjoining a new one and becoming in turn a part of future ones. This 
means that it is not a question of what comes first – the caesura or continuity, 
the instant or duration, Bachelard or Bergson – nor is it a question of which 
one is made up of the other, for lingering on such a dichotomy is misleading: 
they are together one.
Althusser’s rendering together of the swerve and the encounter dem-
onstrates this compositionality most capably. As he says, a swerve induces 
an encounter of one atom “with the atom next to it, and, from encounter to 
encounter, a pile-up and the birth of a world – that is to say, of the agglom-
eration of atoms induced, in a chain reaction, by the initial swerve and 
encounter”.52 We can thus see how a swerve and an encounter combine to 
produce a world – a world, moreover, that is in no way necessary but instead 
always contingently becoming necessary (and becoming unnecessary, it might 
be added). A world is born from an unraveling and diverging continuity of het-
erogeneity, a succession or progression of dynamic and intensive encounters. 
This becoming does not occur all at once, nor are previous encounters in the 
chain ever fully done with, since they make themselves felt as themselves in the 
present encounter under consideration (as well as every swerve-encounter in 
between).53 As Bergson says when remarking on the process of falling asleep, it 
is not just the last tick of the clock that causes one to fall asleep. Rather, it is the 
accumulation of time – the previous ticks heard as it were – that collectively 
make themselves felt in a present moment that is rich or laden with them:
When the regular oscillations of the pendulum make us sleepy, is it the 
last sound heard, the last movement perceived, which produces this 
effect? No, undoubtedly not, for why then should not the first have done 
the same? Is it the recollection of the preceding sounds or movements, set 
in juxtaposition to the last one? But this same recollection, if it is later on 
set in juxtaposition to a single sound or movement, will remain without 
effect. Hence we must admit that the sounds combined with one another 
52    Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 191.
53    Deleuze gives a quite similar description of creative emergence when remarking on the 
Foucauldian historian who proceeds gradually and successively: “[W]hen a new forma-
tion appears, with new rules and series, it never comes all at once, in a single phrase or act 
of creation, but emerges like a series of ‘building blocks’, with gaps, traces and reactiva-
tions of former elements that survive under the new rules” (Deleuze, Foucault, 21–22).
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and acted, not by their quantity as quantity, but by the quality which the 
quantity exhibited, i.e. by the rhythmic organization of the whole.54
Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the encounter has much in common with 
Bergson’s last tick of the clock and Althusser’s tipping point. As Deleuze and 
Guattari note, the most important point in a series is the penultimate point – 
the last point before the point of change. The significance of this penultimate 
point is that it gives consistency to the series that leads up to it; it marks the 
limit beyond which a new threshold of consistency is engendered. As an exam-
ple, the most important drink for an alcoholic, within their series of drinks, is 
the one before the one that will force them to discontinue drinking (by render-
ing them physically incapable of continuing to drink). The ideal alcoholic is 
thus the one who reaches for the penultimate drink but never for the one after, 
since to do so would hamper their ability to continue their drinking session, 
and perhaps their way of life.55 Put otherwise, the art of alcoholism consists 
in knowing how to align the last drink with the penultimate one, for knowing 
where this penultimate point lies is essential to warding off a change in kind.
My point, however, is the following: it is not just the penultimate moment 
that is responsible for the series leading to it, for the penultimate moment is 
itself produced (in part) by that very series. As Deleuze says of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
and Lowry’s alcoholism, their disintegration is in part brought about by the 
gallons of alcohol already in their body – the body laden with past drinks;56 
their crack-up may appear suddenly, but it is certainly not disconnected from 
the life that has been lived leading up to that point, regardless of one’s powers 
of denial. But to be rich with the past is not merely to retrospectively posit it or 
to ‘recollect’ it in a certain way, for this would be nothing more than a form of 
presentism or State subjugation. Rather, for a penultimate moment to be rich 
or laden with the series that leads up to it means that the past moments of the 
series must themselves be alive and vital, effective of and within the present.
The upshot of this ontological account is that the present forms a hetero-
geneous continuity with the past, and it is this continuity as a whole that con-
tinuously undergoes change. The ‘as a whole’ aspect is key, because it indicates 
how the relation here is not between an inert past and a vital present. Rather, 
it is the relation itself, or ‘interpenetration’ as Bergson might say, that is vital. 
54    H. Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. 
F. L. Pogson (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001), 105–6.
55    Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 438.
56    G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. C. V. Boundas, trans. M. Lester with C. Stivale (London: 
Continuum, 1990), 157.
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Accordingly, if the past is contingent then this is not simply because it is retro-
spectively posited by the present in various ways, but more profoundly because 
it itself continues to be contingent through its continual participation in the 
emerging whole that is reality – in other words, it is continuously contingent, 
not retrospectively.
This nonlinear form of contingency may go beyond what Deleuze and 
Guattari originally had in mind, giving rise to not only a ‘universal history of 
contingency’ but also a ‘contingency of universal history’ (a phrase they never 
actually use). Nevertheless, it would appear to be necessary if we are to think 
“not only the contingency of necessity, but also the necessity of the contin-
gency at its root”.57 It would furthermore appear to be needed if we are to avoid 
inappropriately conflating the universal-contingency of the capitalist machine 
with the overcoding of the despotic machine. For while the contingency of 
capitalism may be retrospective in one sense or in some instances, it could 
also be said to be much more than this: capitalism is not universal ‘once and 
for all’ but is rather continually universal ‘again and again’. If there is a differ-
ence between these two universals, it is that one is necessary while the other is 
contingent. And following, one is incapable of understanding ‘unforeseeable 
creativity’ while the other is compatible with it. 
6 Conclusion
Throughout this analysis of universal history we have encountered a number 
of conceptions and uses of contingency and necessity. At stake in these discus-
sions has been the possibility of articulating and defending a notion of uni-
versal history that is not at odds with creativity and critique, but, ideally, is 
one with them. For Hegel, the processes of self-realization, self-consciousness, 
self-determination, etc. are eminently historical. They also require in their 
own way a form of contingency. But as Deleuze and Guattari point out, it is 
questionable just how open this form of contingency actually is, since it would 
appear that the processes of becoming in Hegel are ultimately reducible to the 
being of Geist and the necessary history of reason.
In response to Hegel’s brand of historicism, Deleuze and Guattari do not 
abandon universal history but rather suggest to us a different kind. This uni-
versal history differs from Hegel’s principally with respect to the form of its 
universalism: while the universalism of Hegel’s philosophy of history operates 
by way of overcoding – the totalizing re-interpretation of all history from the 
57    Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 187.
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perspective of reason – the universalism of Deleuze and Guattari’s universal 
history owes its nature to the capitalistic process of decoding/deterritorializa-
tion and its complementary relation with axiomatization. As a consequence 
of this difference, Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history could be said to be 
a universal history of contingency, as opposed to necessity, since capitalism 
bears no intrinsic essence and occupies no privileged vantage point. Thus in 
contrast to a dialectical mechanism that progresses through negation and the 
elimination of contingency towards absolute necessity, the universalism of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative is a product of the conjugation of decoding 
with axiomatization, and what results from this is a proliferation of contingen-
cies. In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history could be said to be 
the converse of Hegel’s: while one is linear, teleological and proceeds by way of 
negation and overcoding, the other is nonlinear, non-teleological and proceeds 
by way of affirmation and decoding. Although it may be true that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s universal history at times replicates facets of Hegel’s (for example, 
when focusing on its retrospectivity), the novelty and significance of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s theory of universal history can be maintained and reasserted by 
insisting on the nonlinear nature of contingency, as can be sourced from their 
wider ontology. The result is a kind of history, I would suggest, that evades the 
historicism of Hegel and remains faithful to the processes of becoming and 
creativity.
